Indirect message injection for MAC generation by Al Mashrafi, Mufeed et al.
This is the author’s version of a work that was submitted/accepted for pub-
lication in the following source:
Al Mashrafi, Mufeed, Bartlett, Harry, Dawson, Ed, Simpson, Leonie, &
Wong, Kenneth Koon-Ho (2013) Indirect message injection for MAC gen-
eration. Journal of Mathematical Cryptology, 7 (3), pp. 253-277.
This file was downloaded from: http://eprints.qut.edu.au/64776/
c© Copyright 2013 Walter de Gruyter GmbH
The final publication is available at www.degruyter.com
Notice: Changes introduced as a result of publishing processes such as
copy-editing and formatting may not be reflected in this document. For a
definitive version of this work, please refer to the published source:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/jmc-2013-5005
J. Math. Cryptol. ? (????), 1–25
DOI 10.1515/ jmc-????-??? © de Gruyter ????
Indirect message injection for MAC generation
Mufeed AlMashrafi, Harry Bartlett, Ed Dawson, Leonie Simpson
and Kenneth Koon-Ho Wong
Communicated by ???
Abstract. This paper presents a model for the generation of a MAC tag using a stream
cipher. The input message is used indirectly to control segments of the keystream that
form the MAC tag. Several recent proposals can be considered as instances of this general
model, as they all perform message accumulation in this way. However, they use slightly
different processes in the message preparation and finalisation phases. We examine the
security of this model for different options and against different types of attack, and con-
clude that the indirect injection model can be used to generate MAC tags securely for
certain combinations of options. Careful consideration is required at the design stage to
avoid combinations of options that result in susceptibility to forgery attacks. Additionally,
some implementations may be vulnerable to side-channel attacks if used in Authenticated
Encryption (AE) algorithms. We give design recommendations to provide resistance to
these attacks for proposals following this model.
Keywords. MAC, Stream ciphers, Message injection, Collision attacks, Forgery attacks,
Side-channel attacks.
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1 Introduction
A Message Authentication Code (MAC) is used to provide assurance of the in-
tegrity of messages, and requires use of an algorithm along with knowledge of
a secret key. MACs are commonly formed using either keyed hash functions or
block ciphers in certain modes of operation, such as CBC mode. More recently,
algorithms to construct a MAC using a stream cipher have been proposed. Some
proposals which make use of symmetric ciphers claim to provide both confiden-
tiality and integrity assurance simultaneously. Such proposals are referred to as
Authenticated Encryption (AE) [5, 6]. The threat model for authenticated encryp-
tion may vary, depending on whether the MAC is constructed from plaintext or
ciphertext. In [5, 6], it is proved that performing encryption first and then form-
ing a MAC for the resulting ciphertext provides the greatest security for authen-
ticated encryption, provided that the underlying integrity component is strongly
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unforgeable. In this paper, we investigate the integrity components of several ex-
isting authenticated encryption proposals to determine the conditions under which
the components are strongly unforgeable. The paper includes research previously
presented in [2], along with the results of additional investigations into statistical
properties and side channel attacks.
There is extensive research in the existing literature on generating MAC tags us-
ing block cipher algorithms, but much less on generating MAC tags using stream
ciphers. This may be due to the existence of block cipher standards such as DES
and AES with well known modes of operation. However, stream ciphers have
a smaller footprint in hardware (and often software) applications and are gener-
ally faster, so a stream-cipher based MAC is worth considering. These may be
especially useful for resource constrained applications, where block-cipher based
MACs may be unsuitable.
Lai et al. [18] proposed a cryptographic checksum algorithm based on stream
ciphers. Golic´ also describes a mode of operation to generate a MAC using a
stream cipher [14]. Of the thirty-four stream cipher proposals submitted to the
eSTREAM project [9], seven claimed to provide AE. More recently, the NIST
competition to develop a new cryptographic hash algorithm (to be known as SHA-
3) received sixty-four submissions; seven of these used stream cipher algorithms
to generate a hash value. Although flaws exist in these proposals, resulting in none
of them being considered as finalists in the respective competitions, the proposals
themselves demonstrate interest in MAC generation using stream ciphers.
Nakano et al. [22] proposed a general model for generating a hash value using
a stream cipher by injecting the input message directly into the internal states of
the cipher. Their security analysis suggests that the message injection function
is critical in achieving collision resistance for MACs which fit their model. In
[21], the hash function properties associated with two different methods for direct
message injection into the internal states of the ciphers are considered. In [3] this
approach is adapted for MAC generation using direct injection into the internal
state of a nonlinear filter generator.
In this paper we analyse proposals for MAC generation which use stream ci-
phers in an entirely different way from the direct injection method of the Nakano
model [22]. Rather than direct injection, some existing stream cipher based MAC
proposals use the input message to control the compression of a bitstream from a
keystream generator to form a MAC tag. We refer to this method as indirect mes-
sage injection. We present a general model for generating a MAC tag using stream
ciphers in this way, and use a matrix representation of the MAC tag generation
process in our analysis. We consider certain design options for MAC generation
under this model, and analyse the security implications associated with particular
option choices with respect to the resistance provided to forgery attacks and side
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channel attacks. We apply this analysis to three proposals: Sfinks [7], 128-EIA3
[11, 12] and Grain-128a [1].
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the phases in generating a
MAC tag, and Sections 2.1 and 2.2 describe a method for performing authenticated
encryption and a general model for generating a MAC using a stream cipher and
indirect message injection. Three specific algorithms that use a stream cipher to
generate a MAC tag in this way (Grain-128a, Sfinks and 128-EIA3) are examined
in Section 3. Our security analysis for the general model is presented in Section
4, and for these specific MAC algorithms in Section 5. Concluding remarks are
contained in Section 6.
2 MAC generation using indirect message injection
A MAC algorithm takes as input an arbitrary length message M of length l bits; a
k-bit secret key, K; and optionally a v-bit initialisation vector IV . The algorithm
output is a MAC tag of fixed length d. Common values for d are 32, 64 or 128
bits. The generation of a MAC tag usually involves three phases, which we refer
to as preparation, accumulation and finalization. The preparation phase involves
both initializing the internal states of the integrity components of the device, and
preparing the input message. Message preparation may require the addition of
padding bits to the beginning or end of the message. The accumulation phase is
where the input message is processed and values are accumulated in the internal
states of the integrity components of the device. The finalization phase completes
the processing of the MAC tag. This is usually performed by combining the stored
value at the end of the accumulation phase with a masking value.
A MAC tag may be computed for either plaintext or ciphertext, so we use the
more general term message to cover both of these input types. The most common
structures for MAC algorithms use the message directly, accumulate bits or words,
and then apply a finalization phase to generate the MAC tag [23]. Some AE stream
cipher proposals use a very different authentication strategy, which makes use of a
keystream sequence. Rather than using the message (either plaintext or ciphertext)
directly in the accumulation phase, these proposals use the message as a means to
control the accumulation of a keystream sequence. After the message has been
processed, the accumulated value then forms the basis of the MAC tag for the
input message. In this section we describe explicitly a model for generating a
MAC tag using stream ciphers in this manner.
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2.1 General structure
The keystream generator of a stream cipher takes as inputs a secret key K and a
public IV, and generates a pseudorandom binary sequence. Usually, these binary
sequences are used as keystream for a binary additive stream cipher to provide
confidentiality for plaintext messages. However, they can also be used for integrity
applications. Where authenticated encryption is required, the bitstream used for
the integrity application can be produced by the same generator as the bitstream
used for the confidentiality application, but a different keystream generator could
also be used.
Figure 1(a) illustrates the case where a single keystream generator using a key
K and an IV produces two different binary sequences, z and y, used for confiden-
tiality and integrity applications, respectively. Considering the order in which the
encryption and authentication operations are performed, and using the terminol-
ogy of [6] this may be described as Encrypt and MAC, if the input to the integrity
component is the plaintext; or Encrypt then MAC, if the input to the integrity com-
ponent is the ciphertext. For the case where one keystream generator produces both
sequences z and y, we assume that the two bitstreams used are distinct. Example
of algorithms that operate in this manner are Grain-128a [1] and Sfinks [7].
Alternatively, two bitstreams z and y could be generated by separate keystream
generators, as shown in Figure 1(b). Distinct keys and IVs are used for each gen-
erator: KC and IVC for the confidentiality component, and KI and IVI for the
integrity component, respectively. If the MAC is formed from the plaintext, then
this is the traditional method of encryption and a separate MAC. If the ciphertext
is used as the input to the MAC then, using the terminology of [6], this may be
described as Encrypt then MAC. Algorithms operating in this manner are SNOW
3G [10], used in 128-EIA2; and ZUC [11], used in 128-EIA3.
Keystream Generator 
Confidentiality  Integrity 
Plaintext 
yt zt 
MAC tag  Ciphertext 
IV K 
Confidentiality  Integrity 
Plaintext 
yt zt 
MAC tag  Ciphertext 
IVI KI IVC KC 
Keystream Generator Keystream Generator 
(a) (b)
Figure 1. Stuctures for providing authenticated encryption using stream ciphers
In either case, our interest is in the process by which the MAC is generated.
That is, our analysis focuses on the integrity component of the designs, which is
the part of Figure 1 (in both structures (a) and (b)) inside the dashed line.
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2.2 Structure of integrity algorithm
For MAC generation using indirect message injection, the major components used
are two registers, each consisting of d binary stages, where d is the length of the
MAC tag. The relationship between these two registers, the binary keystream
sequence and the input message M is shown in Figure 2.
Shift Register R r[0] r[d-1] 
Register A a[0] a[d-1] 
mi 
MAC tag 
Accumulation  
Finalisation  
Final mask  
(F) 
yt 
Figure 2. MAC generation using indirect message injection
The first register, denoted R, is a shift register. Let Rt denote the contents of
register R at time t, with Rt = [rt(0), . . . , rt(d − 1)]. The initial contents of R
are R0 = [r0(0), . . . , r0(d − 1)]. At each time t, for t > 0, the contents of R are
updated using bit yt−1 from the binary sequence y as follows:
Rt(i) =
{
rt−1(i+ 1) for i = 0, . . . , d− 2
yt−1 for i = d− 1
(2.1)
Thus the contents of register R can be considered as a d-bit “sliding window” on
the sequence R0||y, where || denotes concatenation.
The second register is an accumulation register, denoted A. Let At denote the
contents of register A at time t, with At = [At(0), . . . , At(d − 1)]. The initial
contents of A are A0 = [a0(0), . . . , a0(d − 1)]. At time t, the contents of register
A are updated using the existing contents of A and the contents of register R,
conditional on the value of the input message bit Mt. If the message bit Mt at
time t is 1, then register A is updated by bitwise XORing with the contents of
register Rt; otherwise the contents of A remain unchanged, as given in equation
2.2.
At =
{
At−1 ⊕Rt−1 if Mt = 1
At−1 otherwise.
(2.2)
The input message M controls which of the d-bit segments of the sequence
R0||y are accumulated into register A. In this paper we use a matrix represen-
tation of the accumulation process for our analysis. Consider Ai as an array of
d bits, representing the d values in register A when the ith message bit has been
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processed. The contents of Ai can be expressed as Ai = A0 ⊕ TiMi, where A0 is
the array containing the initial values of register A, Mi consists of the first i bits
of the message M and Ti is a d× i matrix such that the jth column of Ti contains
Rj , for j = 0, 1, . . . , i − 1. The matrix representation for Ai as A0 ⊕ TiMi, is
given below.

a0(0)
a0(1)
a0(2)
...
a0(d− 1)

⊕

r0(0) r0(1) · · · r0(d− 1) y0 · · · yi−d−1
r0(1) r0(2) · · · y0 y1 · · · yi−d
...
...
...
...
...
r0(d− 1) y0 · · · yd−2 yd−1 · · · yi−2


m0
m1
...
mi−1

(2.3)
Note that each row of Ti consists of i consecutive bits from the sequence R0||y,
and is closely related to the rows above and below it (each row is a bit-shifted ver-
sion of the rows above and below it). The accumulation process begins after the
two registers have been initialised and the input message prepared for processing.
Many authentication algorithms refer to this message processing phase as a com-
pression function. In this paper we refer to it as the accumulation phase of MAC
generation. We consider the message processing phase as a whole, but also as the
composition of many iterations of a sub-process. This is necessary in identifying
potential forgery attacks.
Once all of the message bits have been processed, the MAC finalization phase
begins. This involves combining the final contents of register A with a masking
value. Let F = [f(0), f(1), . . . , f(d − 1)] denote this d-bit final mask. Thus, for
a message M of length l the MAC is formed as follows:
MAC(Ml) = Al ⊕ F = A0 ⊕ TlMl ⊕ F. (2.4)
2.3 Optional processes
For the general model using indirect message injection in the accumulation phase,
as shown in Figure 2, we consider several options for the preparation and finaliza-
tion phases, respectively. The security implications of these options are discussed
in Section 4 of this paper.
In the preparation phase the options relate to the initialization of the two
registers R and A, and to preparation of the message. Either register could be
initialized with fixed values, such as all-zeroes; or with key dependent values,
such as a segment from the keystream sequence y. The input message could be
padded, by appending a specified sequence of bits at either the beginning, the end,
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or at both places. Alternatively no padding could be applied. If Ml is padded with
n bits, we use Mp to denote the padded message, where p = l + n.
In the finalization phase the final contents of accumulation registerA are com-
bined with a mask, F , as shown in Figure 2. The mask may be obtained from the
sequence y used in the accumulation function, or from another sequence. For AE
applications, this may be the sequence z used for the confidentiality component.
In some cases, a null mask (all zero values) is used.
3 Recent proposals using this model
Several AE stream cipher proposals use the model presented in this paper, but with
slight differences in the choice of options. As each proposal uses the same process
for the accumulation phase (described in Section 2.2), we describe only the options
taken for the preparation and finalisation phases of the ciphers. In this section we
examine the MAC generation processes for Grain128-a, Sfinks and both Version
1.4 and Version 1.5 of 128-EIA3.
3.1 Grain-128a
Grain-128a [1] is a bit-based cipher from the Grain stream cipher family [17] with
an added authentication mechanism. Grain-128a uses a 128-bit secret key and a
96-bit public IV, and generates two different sequences y and z, used for integrity
and confidentiality applications, respectively. The MAC tag has length d = 32
bits. It is not clear from the cipher specification whether the message used for
MAC generation is plaintext or ciphertext. However, the designers claim that the
authetication mechanism is similar to ZUC (that is, 128-EIA3), so we will con-
sider this message to be ciphertext. According to the classification of [5, 6], this
algorithm therefore uses an encrypt-then-MAC procedure. The two discretionary
phases of MAC generation for the Grain-128a design are as follows:
Preparation phase: Both registers R and A are initialized directly from the
Grain-128a bitstreams. Let [y−64, y−63, . . . , y−33, y−32, . . . , y−1] denote the first
64 bits of the keystream y. Then A0 and R0 are as follows:
A0 =

y−64
y−63
...
y−33
 (3.1)
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and
R0 =

y−32
y−31
...
y−1
 (3.2)
The input message is padded with a single bit of value 1 at the end of the message,
so Mp =Ml||1 = [m0,m1, . . . ,ml−1, 1].
Finalization phase: After all l + 1 bits of the padded message have been pro-
cessed, the contents of register A at time l + 1 represents the final MAC tag. That
is, the final mask F is a null mask (consists of all zero values). So for Grain-128a,
the matrix representation of the MAC tag is given by:
MAC(Mp) =

y−64
y−63
...
y−34
y−33

⊕

y−32 y−31 · · · yl−32
y−31 y−30 · · · yl−31
...
...
...
y−2 y−1 · · · yl−2
y−1 y0 · · · yl−1


m0
m1
...
ml−1
1

(3.3)
3.2 Sfinks
The Sfinks [7] stream cipher proposal submitted to eSTREAM [9] includes an au-
thentication mechanism. The keystream generator uses an 80-bit secret key and an
80-bit IV to form an initial state for a 256-stage binary linear feedback shift regis-
ter (LFSR), which is the major component of the keystream generator. Nonlinear
filters are applied to the state of the LFSR to produce two different sequences y
and z, used for integrity and confidentiality applications, respectively. Two ad-
ditional 64-bit registers are used in the authentication mechanism in the manner
shown in Figure 2. The Sfinks MAC tag has length d = 64 bits and is generated
from the plaintext; it is then appended to the ciphertext to form the transmitted
message. According to the classification of [5, 6], this algorithm therefore uses a
MAC-then-encrypt procedure. The two discretionary phases of MAC generation
for the Sfinks design are as follows:
Preparation phase: Before processing the message, both registers R and A
are set to zero and an initialization algorithm is used to incorporate the first 128
bits of keystream [y−128, y−127, . . . , y−1] into the initial values of these registers.
This algorithm consists of updating the registers R and A 128 times, according
to equations 2.1 and 2.2, but with mi = 1 for −127 ≤ i ≤ 0. Note that this
process is equivalent to setting both R0 and A0 to all zero and padding the input
Indirect message injection for MACs 9
message at the beginning by concatenating with a sequence of 128 ones. That is,
Mp = [1, 1, . . . , 1]||[m0,m1, . . . ,ml−1].
Finalization phase: After all of the bits of Mp have been processed, the con-
tents of register A are combined (by XORing) with a final mask that comprises 64
consecutive bits from the confidentiality sequence z, beginning immediately after
the segment used to encrypt the input message. For Sfinks, the matrix representa-
tion of the MAC tag is given by:
MAC(Mp) =

0 0 · · · 0 y−128 · · · yl−65
0 0 · · · y−128 y−127 · · · yl−64
...
...
...
...
...
0 0 · · · y−67 y−66 · · · yl−3
0 y−128 · · · y−66 y−65 · · · yl−2


1
...
1
m0
...
ml−1

⊕

zl
zl+1
zl+2
...
zl+62
zl+63

(3.4)
3.3 128-EIA3 version 1.4
Version 1.4 of the 128-EIA3 [11] integrity algorithm uses the ZUC stream cipher
[12] as a keystream generator. ZUC is a word-based stream cipher operating on
32-bit words. It uses a 128-bit secret key and a 128-bit IV. The 128-EIA3 MAC
tag has length d = 32 bits and is generated from the ciphertext before the two are
concatenated to form the final transmitted message. According to the classifica-
tion of [5, 6], this algorithm thus uses an encrypt-then-MAC procedure. The two
discretionary phases of MAC generation for the 128-EIA3 version 1.4 design are
as follows:
Preparation phase: The 128-EIA3 algorithm does not use physical registers
forR andA, but instead represents these registers using variables k and T , respec-
tively. In this paper we retain our notation, and use R and A for the two 32-bit
intermediate storage variables. In the preparation phase, register A is initialized
with all zero values, and register R is initialised with bits from the keystream se-
quence y. Let [y−32, y−31, . . . , y−1] denote the first 32 bits of y. Then
R0 =

y−32
y−31
...
y−1
 (3.5)
The input message Ml is padded by adding one bit of value 1 at the end of the
message, so Mp =Ml||1 = [m0,m1, . . . ,ml−1, 1].
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Finalization phase: After all l + 1 bits of the padded message have been pro-
cessed, the contents of register A at time l + 1 are combined with the final mask.
The final mask consists of 32 consecutive bits from the sequence y, beginning at
yl+32. The final 128-EIA3 Version 1.4 MAC tag is given by:
MAC(Mp) =

y−32 y−31 · · · y−1 y0 · · · yl−32
y−31 y−30 · · · y0 y1 · · · yl−31
...
...
...
...
...
y−2 y−1 · · · y29 y30 · · · yl−32
y−1 y0 · · · y30 y31 · · · yl−31


m0
m1
...
ml−1
1

⊕

yl+32
yl+33
...
yl+62
yl+63

(3.6)
3.4 128-EIA3 version 1.5
Version 1.5 of 128-EIA3 was proposed in response to a successful forgery attack
[13] on version 1.4. We discuss this attack in more detail in Section 4. Verson
1.5 is identical to version 1.4 except for the values used for the final mask. Al-
though the final mask is still obtained from the sequence y, instead of taking the
32 consecutive bits starting with y(l + 32), the final mask in version 1.5 starts at
the beginning of the next 32-bit word of keystream. Thus the 128-EIA3 Version
1.5 MAC tag is given by:
MAC(Mp) =

y−32 y−31 · · · y−1 y0 · · · yl−32
y−31 y−30 · · · y0 y1 · · · yl−31
...
...
...
...
...
y−2 y−1 · · · y29 y30 · · · yl−32
y−1 y0 · · · y30 y31 · · · yl−31


m0
m1
...
ml−1
1

⊕

y(dl/32e+1)∗32
y((dl/32e+1)∗32)+1
...
y((dl/32e+1)∗32)+30
y((dl/32e+1)∗32)+31

(3.7)
4 Security Analysis of MAC algorithms
In this section we consider the security of MAC tags generated using the input
message indirectly, as in the general model described above. We consider the
security provided by the model with respect to both forgery attacks and side chan-
nel attacks. We provide recommendations and design guidelines for providing
resistance to these types of attacks. In our analysis we assume that the binary se-
quences generated by the keystream generators are pseudo-random and cannot be
distinguished from a truly random source.
Indirect message injection for MACs 11
4.1 Forgery attacks on MAC algorithms
To be considered secure, a MAC algorithm using a k-bit key, K, and producing
a d-bit MAC tag should provide resistance against forgery attacks. That is, an
attacker who does not know the secret keyK but knows other information, such as
sets of input messages and the corresponding MACs formed using the secret key
(and possibly other public information such as the initialisation vectors), should
not be able to produce a valid MAC for any other message with any probability
better than guessing [16,20]. A naive attacker may attempt to guess either the d-bit
MAC value, or the secret key, K, which could be used to compute the MAC for
any message, requiring at most 2d and 2k guesses, respectively. Other attacks can
be compared with the effort required for these naive approaches.
Consider the possibility of a forgery attack being conducted as follows. Suppose
for a message M a MAC tag MACK,IV (M) is generated using key K and IV .
The sender intends to transmit M and the MAC tag MACK,IV (M) to a partic-
ular receiver. Assume a man-in-the-middle attacker intercepts the message-MAC
tag pair. The attacker tries to modify M and possibly also MACK,IV (M). The
attacker then sends the pair (M ′,MACK,IV (M ′)) to the intended message recip-
ient. If it is possible to alter M to M ′ and produce a valid MACK,IV (M ′) for M ′
without any knowledge of the keystream sequences used to generateMACK,IV (M),
then the forgery attack will be successful. We investigate the possibility of such
forgeries for modifications to the message involving flipping, deleting and insert-
ing bits into M .
Our analysis of the resistance to forgery attacks considers the security of the
accumulation process, and explores the security implications of particular choices
from the various options for the preparation and finalisation phases. Recall from
equation 2.3 that MACK,IV (Ml) = A0⊕ TlMl⊕F = (TlMl)⊕ (A0⊕F ). That
is, the final MAC tag is simply the linear combination of the separate effects of the
accumulation process TlMl and the masking vector A0⊕F . In many cases, modi-
fying the bits between the ends of a non-zero message changes the segments of the
(unknown) pseudorandom sequence accumulated in register A, so does not lead
directly to forgery attacks. We consider possible forgeries related to modification
of the bits at either of the ends of message M . We first explore the security of the
accumulation process, represented in the matrix form as TlMl, and then explore
the security implications of certain choices for the masking vector A0 ⊕ F .
Security considerations for the accumulation process
Consider a message M of length l, with no padding. Let X = [x0, x1, . . . , xd−1]
denote the output of the accumulation process. We represent this in matrix form
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as follows:
X(Ml) =

x0
x1
...
xd−1
 =

r0(0) r0(1) · · · r0(d− 1) y0 · · · yl−d−1
r0(1) r0(2) · · · y0 y1 · · · yl−d
...
...
...
...
...
r0(d− 1) y0 · · · yd−2 yd−1 · · · yl−2


m0
m1
...
ml−1

(4.1)
Where a message M is modified to obtain a new message M ′, we will use the
notation X ′ = [x′0, x
′
1, . . . , x
′
d−1] to refer to X(M
′).
Bit flipping forgeries
Consider firstly the simple case where R is initialised with zero values. That
is, R0 = [0, 0, . . . 0]. Then all elements in the first column of matrix Tl are zero,
and hence m0, the first bit of Ml, has no effect on the value of X(Ml). Let m¯i
denote the complement of mi. Consider two messages Ml = [m0,m1, . . . ,ml−1]
and M ′l = [m¯0,m1, . . . ,ml−1]. Clearly X(Ml) = TlMl = TlM
′
l = X(M
′
l ). This
collision leads direstly to a forgery; the attacker can provide a valid X ′ for M ′
with probability of 1.
Similarly, since all elements in the second column of matrix Tl are zero, except
possibly y0, clearly m1, the second bit of Ml, only affects bit xd−1 of X(Ml).
Modifying Ml so that M ′l = [m0, m¯1, . . . ,ml−1] requires the attacker to guess
only x′d−1 to construct a valid X(M
′). The probability that X(Ml) = X(M ′l ) is
therefore 0.5. Similarly, for a message M ′′l = [m¯0, m¯1, . . . ,ml−1], the probability
that X(Ml) = X(M ′′l ) is 0.5. In general, if we flip bit mi and any of the bits up to
mi in the original message, for 0 ≤ i ≤ d − 1, then the probability of a collision
with X(Ml) is 2−i. Such a forgery attack therefore succeeds with probability 2−i.
Consider now the case whereR0 is known and of the form [1, 0, 0, . . . , 0]. Then
all elements in the first column of matrix Tl are zero, except r0(0). Now m0,
the first bit of Ml, affects only the value of bit x0 of X(Ml). Thus it is possible to
modifyMl by flippingm0 and to provide a validX ′ forM ′l = [m¯0,m1, . . . ,ml−1]
by flipping x0. That is, X(M ′) = [x¯0, x1, . . . , xl−1]. Thus an attacker can provide
a valid X ′ for M ′ with probability of 1.
Similarly, for R0 = [1, 1, 0, . . . , 0], all elements in the first column of Tl are
zero, except r0(0) and r0(1), and all elements in the second column of Tl are
zero, except r0(1) and possibly y0. Thus message bit m0 affects only the values
of bits x0 and x1 of X(Ml), while message bit m1 affects only the values of
bits x0 and possibly xd−1. Modifying Ml by flipping both m0 and m1 reqires
the attacker to flip only x1 to form x′1, and to guess x
′
d−1 to provide a valid X
′.
Therefore the probability that an attacker can construct a valid vectorX ′ forM ′l =
[m¯0, m¯1, . . . ,ml−1] is 0.5.
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In general, for any known R0, if we flip bit mi and any of the bits up to mi in
the original message Ml, for 0 ≤ i ≤ d − 1, then we can construct a valid X ′ for
this modified message M ′l by flipping the required bits in X and guessing the final
i bits to form X ′. Therefore, the probability that an attacker can construct a valid
vector X ′ for M ′ is 2−i.
Resistance to this type of forgery can be provided in two ways. Fisrtly, rather
than using known values, R can be initialised using key dependent values such
as a segment from the keystream sequence y. Secondly, the message Ml may be
padded by concatenating with a segment of all ones, so thatMp = [1, 1, . . . , 1]||Ml.
The padding should consist of at least d ones, so that all message bits affect all bits
in X , and hence all bits in the final MAC tag, in an unpredictable manner. Note
that a key dependent initialisation of R may be the more efficient approach, as
padding increases both the length of the message and the size of the matrix T ,
requiring at least (d+ l) operations to generate the final MAC tag.
Bit deletion forgeries
Consider modifying message Ml = [m0,m1, . . . ,ml−1] by deleting the first
bit, m0, to obtain M ′l−1 = [m1,m2, . . . ,ml−1]. Then the matrix Tl−1 for M
′
l−1 is
just the matrix Tl for M ′l without the last column of Tl. Note in equation 4.1 that
row i + 1 in matrix T is equivalent to row i shifted one position to the left, for
0 ≤ i ≤ d − 2, and with a new value as the final element in the row. Applying
this to X = TlMl and X ′ = Tl−1M ′l−1, it follows that xi = r0(i)m0 + x
′
i+1, for
0 ≤ i ≤ d− 2.
Now consider again the simple case where R is initialised with zero values.
As all elements in the first column of matrix Tl are zero, xi = x′i+1 for 0 ≤
i ≤ d − 2. That is, for M ′l−1 = [m1,m2, . . . ,ml−1], it is clear that X ′(Ml) =
[β, x0, x1, . . . , xd−2], for some unknown β. We call this the sliding property of
the product TlMl. An attacker can slide X(Ml) and guess β, and hence provide a
valid X ′ for M ′ with probability of 0.5.
Similarly, an attacker can form a message M ′′l−i = [mi−1, . . . ,ml−1] by delet-
ing the first i bits of of the messageMl. Now the output of the accumulation phase
isX(M ′′l−i) = [β0, β1, . . . , βi−1, x0, x1, . . . , xd−i−1], where the bits β0, β1, . . . , βi−1
must be guessed by the attacker. The attacker can provide a valid X for M ′′l−i with
probability 2−i, for 1 ≤ i ≤ d. Note that for i = d, this is effectively a brute force
attack on X , so this attack is only effective for deletion of up to the first d bits of
Ml. This attack can also be adapted for the case where R0 is non-zero but known;
all that is required is to flip the appropriate bits of X , as described for bit flipping
forgeries, before shifting X and guessing the bits β0, β1, . . . , βi−1.
Suppose now that R0 is unknown, but that the first j bits of the message are
known to be zeroes. These bits do not cause any keystream to be accumulated into
register A, so we can again delete the first i ≤ j bits of the input message, shift
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X by i places and guess β0, β1, . . . , βi−1 to obtain a valid X ′ for the modified
message M ′l−i. The attacker can again provide a valid X
′ for M ′ with probability
of 2−i for 1 ≤ i ≤ d.
Resistance to forgery attacks based on the deletion of bits from the start of the
message can be provided in two ways. Firstly, the message can be padded at the
start with at least d ones. Alternatively, R can be initialised using key dependent
values, and the message can be padded at the start with a single one.
Now suppose we consider deleting bits from the end of the message. Assuming
that l > d, if we delete the last bit of Ml, then M ′l−1 = [m0,m1, . . . ,ml−2]. Then
xi = x
′
i+yl−d+i−1ml−1, for 0 ≤ i ≤ d−1. Ifml = 1 the second term is unknown
since it involves keystream bits, and the attacker must guess these elements of the
keystream. Thus it is not feasible to obtain a forgery in this way. However, if
ml−1 = 0, then X(Ml) = X(M ′l−1), and the attacker can forge the MAC tag for
the new message M ′l−1 with probability 1. Similarly, if the final j bits of the input
message are known to be zero, then deleting these bits will not change the final
contents of the accumulation register A, and hence X = X ′ and a forgery is again
possible. Such forgeries can be prevented by padding the message with a final one,
since this is equivalent to having a message of length l + 1 with ml = 1.
Bit insertion forgeries
Consider modifying message Ml = [m0,m1, . . . ,ml−1] by inserting i zero bits
at the end of the message Ml, to obtain M ′l+i = [m0,m1, . . . ,ml−1, 0, 0, . . . , 0].
Using our matrix representation, performing the accumulation phase for M ′l+i re-
quires adding i columns to the matrix Tl used for Ml. During the accumulation
process, regardless of the values in these columns, multiplying by the additional
message bits of value zero does not change the value of X . Hence X(M ′l+i) =
X(Ml), for any i > 0. Again, this collision leads to an obvious forgery attack
which succeeds with probability 1.
Now consider modifying message Ml = [m0,m1, . . . ,ml−1] by inserting an
additional 1 at the end of the messageMl, to obtainM ′l+1 = [m0,m1, . . . ,ml−1, 1].
In our matrix representation, adding an additional bit to the end of Ml requires the
addition of another column to Tl. The additional column of T will be multiplied
by the added message bit of value 1, and this may change the values of X ′. The
probability of obtaining a valid MAC tag X ′ for this modified message M ′l+1 is
the same as the probability of a brute force attack on the MAC. Therefore, forgery
attacks consisting of inserting bits of value zero at the end of the message can be
prevented by padding the message with a bit of value 1 at the end. An equivalent
solution, which we discuss in the following section, is to use a masking term that
depends on the message length.
Now consider modifying message Ml in a different manner; inserting a zero bit
at the beginning of message Ml, to obtain M ′l+1 = [0,m0,m1, . . . ,ml−1]. From
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the structure of Tl and Tl+1 it follows that, in a manner similar to that described in
the discussion of forgeries associated with bit deletion at the start of the message,
x′i = r0(i)0 + xi+1 = xi+1, for 0 ≤ i ≤ d− 2. Hence for M ′l+1 the output of the
accumulation phase is X(M ′l+1) = [x1, x2, . . . , xd−1, α], for some unknown α.
An attacker can guess α and hence provide a valid X ′ for M ′l+1 with probability
equal to 0.5.
Similarly, an attacker can form a message M ′′l+i by adding i zeroes to the be-
ginning of message Ml. The attacker can form the new X ′′ for M ′′l+i as X
′′ =
[xi, xi+1, . . . , xd, α0, α1, . . . , αi−1], where the bitsα0, α1, . . . , αi−1 must be guessed.
Therefore an attacker can provide a valid X ′′ for M ′′l+i with probability 2
−i, for
1 ≤ i ≤ d. This is the basis of the previously reported attack on 128-EIA3 version
1.4 [13].
If R is initialised with zeroes, so that R0 = [0, 0, . . . , 0], then this attack will
work for inserted bits of either value since, using our matrix representation, the
first i bits of M ′′l+i are all multiplied by zeroes in the first d − i + 1 rows of Tl+i.
Therefore, the inserted bits affect only the last i − 1 bits of X ′′l+i, which are bits
that must be guessed anyway. Furthermore, this forgery attack can be adapted to
the case of known (but not necessarily all zero) R0. In that case, the effects of any
inserted bits of value 1 can be determined and allowed for in applying the attack.
From the discussion above, it is clear that attacks involving the insertion of bits
at the start of a message can be prevented by ensuring that R is initialised with
unknown values (keystream) and that the start of the message is padded with at
least one bit of value one.
Security considerations for the masking vectorA0 ⊕ F
The forgeries discussed thus far can all be prevented by making suitable choices
for R0 and padding the message Ml appropriately. More specifically, R should be
initialised with keystream bits, so that the contents are unknown, and the message
Ml should be padded with a bit of value 1 at both ends. The masking vectorA0⊕F
provides an alternative means of preventing many of these forgeries. We explore
the security implications of various options for this term. We begin by noting that
if A0 ⊕ F is to contribute to the security of the MAC tag, it is important that the
contents are unknown to an attacker. Therefore, at least one of A0 and F must be
sourced from keystream.
If R0 is known and there is no message padding, then the accumulation term
X = TlMl is vulnerable to attacks involving the insertion or deletion of zeroes at
the end of the message, and to attacks involving the insertion or deletion of bits
at the start of the message. If R0 is unknown then only the attacks involving the
insertion or deletion of zeroes apply. Forgeries involving insertions or deletions at
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the start of the message rely on the sliding property of TlMl, so thatX ′ is obtained
fromX by shifting the values inX right or left, respectively, adjusting if necessary
and guessing the remaining places. These attacks can be prevented by using an
appropriate mask. For the mask to be effective in this respect, it is important that
changes in the length of the message do not result in corresponding changes in
the position of the mask bits or the sliding property of the accumulation phase
will apply to the MAC as a whole. The easiest way to satisfy this requirement is
to initialise A with bits from a fixed position, such as the start of the keystream
sequence y.
Conversely, forgeries involving the insertion or deletion of zeroes at the end of
the message rely on the fact that the additional bits have no effect on the accu-
mulated value X . Such forgeries can be prevented by using an unknown mask
that depends on the message length. One example of such a mask is constructed
using the values of F obtained as d consecutive keystream bits, starting at a fixed
distance from the last bit of the keystream sequence used in the accumulation
process. Note that padding the message with a final 1 is equivalent to including
F = [yl−d+1, yl−d+2, . . . , yl] as the final mask. That is, it is equivalent to starting
F at a position d− 1 bits before the last bit used in the unpadded case ( yl−1 ).
Together, the choices for A0 and F discussed above provide an effective al-
ternative to message padding as a means of preventing bit insertion and deletion
attacks. Note, however, that the masking term A0 ⊕ F cannot prevent the attacks
based on flipping the message bits.
4.2 Side channel attacks
These are attacks that apply to the (software or hardware) implementations of
cryptographic systems. Variations in the timing, power consumption or electro-
magnetic radiation as the message is processed may leak information, such as the
secret key used or the plaintext input message to the integrity components. In or-
der to carry out such attacks, the attacker must have the means to access the device
and measure the particular characteristic.
In the accumulation phase of the MAC generation process, the input message
acts as a control to determine which states of register R are accumulated into A.
This control mechanism is represented by the scalar multiplication operation⊗, as
shown in Figure 2. An intuitive and effective way to implement the accumulation
phase is to use branching processes that are conditional on the input message bit
at each time step. If Mt, the input bit at time t, is equal to one; then Rt will be
accumulated into register A using the XOR operation; whereas if the input is zero
then we do not need to update the value of A.
If this approach is used, there will clearly be differences in the computation time
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and power consumption for distinct steps in the accumulation process, dependent
on the individual bits of the input message. This opens up an avenue for timing
attacks, whereby the attacker can learn whether a message bit is 1 or 0 at each
clock by monitoring the time taken to complete each step of the accumulation
process. The message can then be recovered bit by bit for as long as the cipher
is monitored. Simple power analysis is also a possible attack method, since state
accumulation at clocks where the input message bit is of value 1 would have a
specific power consumption profile.
Side channel attacks associated with MACs represent a threat to the confiden-
tiality of information in situations where authenticated encryption is used and the
MAC is computed using the plaintext as the input to the MAC. The ciphertext
will be transmitted, and is therefore accessible by an attacker, but the encryption
provides confidentiality for the plaintext. However, a side channel attack on the
integrity component may reveal this plaintext. Note that if a MAC is computed for
the ciphertext, then the side channel attacks do not reveal any additional informa-
tion, as we assume that an attacker will have access to the ciphertext. Therefore,
for authenticated encryption, resistance to side channel attacks can be increased
by first encrypting the message and then using the resulting ciphertext as input to
the integrity component. Similarly, if a MAC is formed for plaintext that will not
be encrypted (that is, we want authentication only, not authenticated encryption)
then the side channel attacks do not reveal any additional information.
Side channel attacks against implementations of the authentication mechanism
based on the different timing and power consumption during message accumula-
tion can be prevented. This requires a slight modification to the design for the
general model given in Figure 2 so that the register A is replaced with two reg-
isters: A0 and A1. Given these two d-bit registers, the update function given in
equation 2.2 is amended so that one register or the other is updated at each time
step, conditional on the value ofMt. That is, ifM(t) = 0, thenA0t = A
0
t−1⊕Rt−1
and A1 is unchanged. However, if M(t) = 1, then A1t = A
1
t−1 ⊕ Rt−1 and A0 is
unchanged. Thus the same operation is performed at each step. This modification
requires an additional register to implement the design, and additional accumula-
tion operations (XOR) will be performed. On average, the number of additional
operations will be around half the message length. In order to implement this
modified model, the MAC finalisation phase must be specified. One simple way
to complete the MAC process is to use the contents of just one of the registers, say
A0, and treat it as register A in the original model. The final contents of the other
register are discarded.
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4.3 Statistical analysis
Statistical tests can be used to test whether the values obtained as MAC tags for
a particular function are uniformly distributed, that is, whether the probability of
obtaining any particular MAC tag value for any input message is equally likely
over the set of all possible key–IV pairs. Three different statistical tests have been
applied to test for this property in a sample of d-tuples, namely the poker test [4],
the universal test [19] and the repetition test [15]. It is shown in [15] that for d >
20 the repetition test is the “best” test to use since this test requires significantly
fewer samples than the other two tests.
The repetition test counts the number of different d-bit patterns occuring in a set
of d-tuples. Based on the birthday paradox, there is an approximately fifty percent
chance of finding at least two d-tuples that match in a randomly generated set of
size 2d/2.
To apply the repetition test to a particular stream cipher based MAC, where the
length of the MAC tag is d-bits, it is necessary to generate a sample of sufficient
size S such that a limited number of repetitions is expected with high probability,
under the hypothesis that the sample is selected at random from a set of uniformly
distributed d-tuples. Under this hypothesis, the number of repeated patterns in a
particular sample of S d-tuples follows a Poisson distribution. The mean, λ, for
this distribution can be calculated using the following equation:
λ = S −N(1− e−S/N )
where N = 2d. If we choose S = 2d/2+3, then the value of λ is approximately 32,
for d > 20. The set of S d-tuples is generated by fixing one of the inputs to the
MAC generation algorithm, and varying the other inputs. For example, the MAC
tags may be generated for a fixed message, using different secret keys and IVs.
Alternatively, the MAC tags may be generated for many different messages, using
a fixed secret key and IV.
The process for running the repetition test is as follows:
(i) Generate a sample of S = 2d/2+3 d-bit MAC values.
(ii) Sort S and count the number of repeated values.
(iii) Compare the number of repetitions from the test with the expected number
λ = 32.
(iv) Compare the test statistic to the relevant statistical tables to find the proba-
bility of obtaining the observed data under the assumed null hypothesis (the
p-value of the test).
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The null hypothesis is that the number of repetitions follows a Poisson distri-
bution with mean λ = 32. The test is applied as a two-tailed test of significance,
as either too many or too few repetitions of particular d-tuples may indicate non-
randomness. A low p-value provides evidence to reject the null hypothesis. The
amount of data required to run this test for the common MAC sizes of 32, 64
and 128 bits is 219, 235 and 267 MAC tags, respectively. Clearly the sample size
required for longer MAC tags makes this test infeasible for 128-bit MACs.
5 Security analysis for existing ciphers
In this section we apply the security analysis from Section 4 to the algorithms
described in Section 3. Specifically, we discuss the feasibility of applying forgery
attacks, side channel attacks and statistical analysis to each of these algorithms.
5.1 Forgery attacks
128-EIA3 Version 1.4
A forgery attack on 128-EIA3 Version 1.4 presented by Fuhr et al. [13] describes
how a message, M , can be modified by inserting additional bits of value zero
at the beginning of M . The attacker makes use of the sliding property between
the keystream sequence used in the accumulation process and the final mask to
compute a valid MAC for the modified message. We explain their attack using the
matrix representation introduced in this paper.
For 128-EIA3, A0 is initialised with all zeroes, so the masking vector is only F .
That is, MAC(Mp) = TpMp ⊕ F . However, F is formed from y, the same se-
quence used as input to R. It consists of 32 consecutive bits of y beginning a fixed
distance after the last bit of y used for the accumulation process. Any modification
to M that increases or decreases the message length causes a corresponding shift
in the segment of y used to form F .
Consider inserting a zero at the start ofM to formM ′. From Section 4 it is clear
that X ′, the output from the accumulation process for M ′, is related to the value
X for the accumulation of the original message M by the sliding relationship, so
X ′ = [x1, x2, . . . , xd−1, α]. Since F also slides by one bit when a zero is appended
to the message, the entire MAC has this property, as noted in [13]. The attacker
need only guess one bit, α, to form a valid MAC forM ′. The same process applies
for inserting i < d zeroes at the start of the message. The attacker can obtain a
valid MAC for such a message with probability 2−i.
We now present another forgery attack on version 1.4 of 128-EIA3; this is a bit
deletion attack which can be applied where the message starts with one or more
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zeroes. If we delete one of these zeroes, then the result X ′ for the accumulation
phase of the modified messageM ′ is related to the valueX for the accumulation of
the original message M by the sliding relationship, so X ′ = [β, x0, x1, . . . , xd−2].
Since F also slides by the same amount the entire MAC has this property. The
attacker need only guess one bit, β, to form a valid MAC forM ′. The same process
applies for deleting i < d zeroes from the start of the message. The attacker can
obtain a valid MAC for such a message with probability 2−i.
For other types of forgeries, resistance to bit flipping forgeries is provided by
initialising R with keystream, and forgeries involving bit insertion or deletion at
the end of the message are prevented because the message has been padded with a
single 1 at the end of the message.
128-EIA3 version 1.5
The modification to the starting position of the 32-bit segment of y used to form
F , introduced in version 1.5 of 128-EIA3, breaks the sliding property on F and
provides effective resistance to the types of forgery discussed above. As was the
case for 128-EIA3 version 1.4, resistance to bit flipping forgeries is provided by
initialising R with keystream, and forgeries involving bit insertion or deletion at
the end of the message are prevented by padding with a single 1 at the end of the
message.
Grain-128a
The cipher Grain-128a initialises both registers R and A with keystream. Bit flip-
ping forgery attacks are prevented by this initialisation of R, and forgeries involv-
ing insertion or deletion of bits at the beginning of the message are prevented by
this initialisation of A, as this breaks the sliding property for the masking value
A0 +F . Forgeries involving insertion or deletion of bits at the end of the message
are prevented by padding with one bit of value 1 at the end of the message.
Sfinks
The cipher Sfinks uses message padding, by prepending 2d ones to Ml to ensure
both registers R and A are initialised with keystream beofre the actual message
Ml is input to the accumulation phase. Bit flipping forgery attacks and forgeries
involving insertion or deletion of bits at the beginning of the message are prevented
by this initialisation of R and A. Additionally, the final mask F is constructed
from a 64 bit segment of z (the sequence used to encrypt Ml for confidentiality)
beginning at zl. Forgeries involving insertion or deletion of bits at the end of the
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message are prevented by the use of this segment that is related to the length of the
message.
5.2 Side channel attacks
Reference implementations are publicly available for each of 128-EIA3 version
1.4 (for example, the C code implementation included in Annex 2 of [11]), 128-
EIA3 version 1.5 [12] and Sfinks [7]. In each case, these algorithms are imple-
mented with branching statements in the accumulation phase, and are therefore
susceptible to the side channel attacks discussed in Section 4. This is a security
concern if these implementations are used in actual applications.
We have been unable to locate any publicly available reference implementation
for Grain-128a. However, the considerations discussed above obviously apply in
developing any practical implementations of this cipher.
5.3 Statistical analysis
The repetition test described in Section 4.3 was applied to sets of MAC tags gen-
erated using each of three algorithms: the Grain-128a algorithm and versions 1.4
and 1.5 of the 128-EIA3 algorithm. Each of these produces a MAC tag of length
32 bits.
In each case, the test was applied to seven different sets of data, each consisting
of 219 MAC tags. Four of the data sets were formed using random messages and
fixed secret keys, two of the data sets were formed using fixed messages and ran-
domly generated secret keys, while the seventh data set used random messages and
random secret keys. The number of repetitions observed (NR) and the associated
p-values are given for each set of tags and each algorithm in Table 1.
As shown in Table 1, the minimum p-value for each of the algorithms tesed was
over 15%. Thus, there is insufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis in any
of the cases tested, and the results support the conclusion that the MAC tags for
each of these algorithms are uniformly distributed.
Similar tests can be carried out on sets of MAC tags from the Sfinks algorithm,
but the longer tag length (64 bits) will require larger storage (235 tags per test) and
a longer processing time.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we describe a general model for using a stream cipher to generate a
MAC tag, where the input message is indirectly injected into the integrity device
in the accumulation phase. The input message could be plaintext or ciphertext.
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128-EIA3 v1.4 128-EIA3 v1.5 Grain-128a
Message Key NR p-value NR p-value NR p-value
Random 1 Fixed 38 0.2888 34 0.7237 27 0.3768
Random 2 Fixed 27 0.3768 40 0.1573 31 0.8597
Random 3 Fixed 24 0.1573 25 0.2159 35 0.5959
Random 4 Fixed 35 0.5959 25 0.2159 24 0.1573
Fixed Random 1 25 0.2159 31 0.8597 26 0.2888
Fixed Random 2 26 0.2888 35 0.5959 38 0.2888
Random 4 Random 3 31 0.8597 31 0.8597 31 0.8597
Table 1. Results of repetition test for 128-EIA3 and Grain-128a algorithms.
We outline the options available for the preparation and finalisation phases in this
model, and relate these options to the security provided against forgery attacks.
We consider forgeries where a message is modified either by flipping, inserting or
deleting message bits from either the start or the end of the message. In addition,
we consider the application of certain forms of side-channel attack. We examine
several authentication proposals that can be described by this model: Grain-128a,
Sfinks and 128-EIA3 (both versions 1.4 and 1.5).
The security analysis with respect to forgeries of the general model reveals that a
man-in-the-middle attacker could intercept a messageM and MACMACK,IV (Ml)
and modify the message and possibly also the MAC in order to provide a valid
MAC for the modified message. The probability that the attacker constructs a
valid MAC for their modified message is better than guessing, for many combina-
tions of options. In order to prevent bit flipping forgeries, the register R should be
initialized with keystream. This also reduces the scope of forgeries involving the
insertion or deletion of bits at the start of the message. Prepadding the message
with at least d ones is a feasible but arguably less efficient alternative. To prevent
the remaining bit insertion and deletion forgeries, both of the following practices
should also be adopted:
(i) Pad the message with a 1 at the start and/or initialise registerAwith keystream
from a fixed location in the sequence.
(ii) Pad the message with a 1 at the end and/or construct the final mask F so that
the contents of F depend on the length of the message.
Implementing the accumulation phase of the authentication mechanism using
a branching process conditional on the input message bit at each time step is an
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intuitive and effective approach. However, this approach may also contribute to
the mechanism being vulnerable to certain forms of side channel attack, such as
a timing attack or simple power analysis. An implementation that consumes the
same amount of time and power for each accumulation step, regardless of the
value of the input message bit, will prevent this type of side channel attack. Such
an implementation may be achieved at the cost of an additional storage register
and a slight reduction in throughput.
As mentioned in Section 1, it was shown in [5, 6] that the AE method offering
the greatest security is provided by an algorithm which first performs encryption
and then uses the ciphertext to form a MAC, provided that the underlying integrity
component is strongly unforgeable. Of the AE algorithms described in Section 3,
the ones which use the encrypt-then-MAC procedure and are strongly unforgeable
(based on the results of Section 4.1) are 128-EIA3 version 1.5 and Grain-128a.
Both of these algorithms also passed the statistical test of Section 4.3, so there is
no evidence of non-uniformity in the distributions of these MAC tags. The only
concern from our analysis of these two algorithms is the need to be careful in the
actual implementation to avoid possible side channel attacks.
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